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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v s . 
WILLIAM WILLEY, III., j 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 950644-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JUEISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Willey on 
September 5, 1995 is considered to be the final decision of the District Court. 
See also Utah Code § 78-2a-3 (2)(f). 
The notice of appeal was filed on November 2, 1995, within 30 days of 
the entry of judgement. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, 
Mr. Willey appeals from his conviction following the entry of his 
conditional pleas of guilty to the Information charging him with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) and 
Possession of Paraphernalia in violation of § 58-37a-5. Specifically, Mr. Willey 
challenges the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
1, On June 7, 1995, Mr. Willey was charged in an Information with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class "B" 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37a-5. 
2. On June 7, 1995, Mr. Willey was arraigned and entered pleas of not 
guilty to all counts of the Information. 
3. On August 3, 1995, Mr, Willey filed a motion to suppress evidence. A 
copy of that motion is contained in Addendum D. 
4. On September 5, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was held on Mr. 
Willey's motion to suppress evidence. On the same day, the motion to 
suppress evidence was denied and Mr. Willey entered conditional pleas of 
guilty to all counts of the Information. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The sentencing was held on September 5, 1995. At that time, the 
District Court imposed a fine in the amount of $555.00. The Notice of Appeal 
was timely filed on October 2, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Trooper Eldridge exceeded the scope and the detention of 
the stop; 
2. Whether Trooper Eldridge had sufficient probable cause to justify 
the warrantless search of the vehicle; and 
3. Whether Trooper Eldridge's questioning was in violation of Mr. 
Willey's "Miranda" rights. 
Legal determinations regarding reasonable suspicion are mixed questions 
of law and fact. Both the legal conclusions and the underlying findings of 
fact are reviewed for correctness, with the Appellate Court affording a 
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measure of discretion to the trial court, with respect to the findings of fact. 
State v. Chapman, P.2d , 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995); and 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). Legal conclusions regarding the 
applicability of "Miranda" warnings are reviewed for correctness. Stewart v. 
State ex. rel. Deland, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Willey was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) and 
Possession of Paraphernalia, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
§ 58-37a-5. 
On September, 1995, a hearing was held on Mr. Willey's motion to 
suppress evidence seized in connection with this matter. At the hearing, 
Trooper Rick Eldridge testified that he was on duty the 28th day of April, 
1995. (T 4) While driving on SR-191, Trooper Eldridge observed a older 
model Volkswagen Van with faulty equipment, namely, a burned out license 
plate. (T 4-5) Trooper Eldridge followed the vehicle for approximately one 
mile before stopping it. (T 20) The trooper testified that all he intended to 
do was to give the driver a verbal warning. (T 16) 
Trooper Eldridge approached the vehicle, noting the presence of two 
occupants and a dog. (T 4) The trooper advised the driver, Mr. Patefield, of 
the equipment violation. (T 5) Mr. Patefield replied that he thought that the 
light had been fixed but that he would fix it again and he asked if he could 
get out of the van and check the light. (T 5) Trooper Eldridge "allowed" Mr. 
Patefield to get out of the van. (T 5) 
As Mr. Patefield exited the van, Trooper Eldridge followed him to the 
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back of the vehicle. (T 5) Mr. Patefield attempted to fix the light and when 
he could not, he went to the side of the van to get some tools. (T 6) 
Trooper Eldridge followed him. (T 6) When they were at the side of the van, 
Trooper Eldridge testified that he could smell the odor of alcohol on Mr. 
Patefield's breath. (T 7) Trooper Eldridge further testified that other than 
the odor of alcohol, Mr. Patefield did not exhibit any other symptoms 
consistent with being impaired. (T 19-20) The District Court found no 
evidence of impairment. (T 39) 
As Mr. Patefield leaned into the van and started to get his tools out of a 
toolbox, Trooper Eldridge looked into the van and saw "lots of backpacks and 
coolers, clothes and whatnot." (T 7) The trooper also noticed several 12-
packs of beer, one of which was open with approximately one-half of the 
containers missing. (T 6) Trooper Eldridge began questioning Mr. Patefield 
about the odor of alcohol and the presence of open containers in the van. (T 
7) Mr. Patefield replied that he had a beer for dinner, that he had not been 
drinking in the vehicle and that there were no open containers. (T 7) 
Trooper Eldridge then replied that he wanted to check the van so as to 
assure himself that there were no open containers. (T 7) Mr. Willey exited 
the van and took the dog. (T 7) Trooper Eldridge began to search the 
vehicle. At one point during the search, Trooper Eldridge testified that he 
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a fanny pack. (T 7) 
When he questioned Mr. Patefield about this, Mr. Patefield opened the fanny 
pack and handed the trooper a marijuana pipe. (T 8) The ensuing search 
revealed further controlled substances and paraphernalia. (T 10-11) Mr. 
Patefield was placed under arres t . (T 12) 
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Mr. Willey was not placed u n d e r a r r e s t . (T 11) The t roope r told Mr. 
Willey t ha t he was going to receive a ci tat ion for the pa rapherna l i a , took his 
d r i v e r s l icense and re leased Mr. Patef ield 's van to him. (T 11) The t rooper 
told Mr. Willey to follow him back to t he public safety bui lding in Monticello. 
(T 11) While the t r oope r was waiting for Mr. Willey to a r r i v e , he searched the 
f anny-pack t h a t contained mari juana and he discovered a se t of dog t ags . (T 
14, 24) When Mr. Willey a r r i ved , Trooper Eldr idge asked him if he owned the 
dog. (T 25) Mr. Willey indicated t h a t he did and the t roope r placed him 
u n d e r a r r e s t for t h e possess ion of a control led subs t ance ( the mari juana 
found in t he fanny pack) . (T 25) 
Mr. Willey filed a p re t r i a l motion to s u p p r e s s ev idence ga the red a t the 
time of the s top . The District Court denied the motion. That same day Mr. 
Willey e n t e r e d condit ional pleas of gui l ty to both coun t s and was sen tenced . 
This appeal follows. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The t r ia l c o u r t incor rec t ly concluded t h a t t h e r e was a consensual 
encoun te r a f te r t h e t roope r had warned the d r ive r abou t the faulty equipment 
violation. The t roope r neve r gave any indication t h a t t he occupan t s were free 
to leave. Controll ing case law mandated t h a t once the t r o o p e r completed the 
reason for t he s top , the occupan t s must be allowed to proceed on the i r way, 
wi thout f u r t h e r de tent ion . If t he se izure had been s t r i c t ly t ied to the 
p u r p o s e of t he traff ic s top , the t r oope r would have allowed them on the i r way 
once he had given the warning abou t t he faulty equipment . 
The t r ia l c o u r t incor rec t ly concluded tha t t h e r e was probable cause 
which just i f ied the wa r r an t l e s s s ea rch of the vehicle. The facts known to the 
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t roope r , t h e missing con ta ine r s out of one open 12-pack of beer and the smell 
of alcohol on the d r i v e r ' s b r e a t h who was determined not to be impaired, did 
not r i se to level of p robab le cause . 
Finally, the t r o o p e r did not have sufficient information to connect Mr. 
Willey with t he c o n t r a b a n d discovered in the f anny -pack . The sea rch of the 
fanny pack disclosed some dog t a g s . Before ques t ion ing Mr. Willey about who 
owned the dog, Mr. Willey should have been advised of his "Miranda" r i g h t s . 
ARGUMENT 
1« Trooper E ldr idge Exceeded the Scope and t h e Detention of t h e Stop. 
In Sta te v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), t h e Utah Supreme Court 
a r t icu la ted a two p r o n g t e s t to determine whe the r a rou t ine traffic s top can 
wi ths tand cons t i tu t iona l s c run i ty : 
(1) Was the police officer 's action 
" just i f ied a t i t s incept ion"? 
(2) Was the r e su l t ing detent ion 
" reasonab ly re la ted in scope to t h e 
c i rcumstances t ha t just if ied the 
i n t e r f e r ence in the f i r s t place"? 
(citation omitted). 
Id., 873 P.2d a t 1131-32. 
In t he case a t hand , i t is conceded t ha t t he t r o o p e r was just i f ied in 
s topping the vehicle due to the faulty equipment violation. Since the s top 
itself is not cha l lenged, two of the ques t ions before t h i s Court involve t he 
second p r o n g of t he t e s t : Specifically, a t what point did t he t rooper exceed 
the scope of t he s top and when the detent ion " las ted longer t han neces sa ry to 
effectuate the p u r p o s e of the s top" . State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 
(Utah Ct. App, 1990), d i sag reed with on o the r g r o u n d s , Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 
n.3. As a mat ter of common sense it would a p p e a r t h a t t he illegality began 
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after the officer had given the driver the warning about the faulty equipment. 
Once a traffic stop is made the 
detention 'must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop". Both the 
"length and [thel scope of the detention 
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' 
the circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible." 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 135. (citations omitted). 
Here, the trooper testified that he only intended to warn the driver and 
after he did so, the trooper should have terminated the encounter or, at the 
very least, indicated that they were free to leave. Instead, the trooper 
stayed and created the appearance of a continued detention and investigation. 
This is underscored by the trooper 's statement that after he told the driver 
about the equipment violation, he then "allowed" the driver to get out of his 
vehicle. Furthermore, the trooper shadowed Mr. Patefield as he attempted to 
fix the license plate light and get tools. Certainly a reasonable person would 
not have felt free to leave or ignore the trooper's presence: 
Once a person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the seizure does 
not cease simply because the police 
formulate an uncommunicated intention 
that the seized person may go on his 
or her way. For the seizure to end, 
it must be clear to the seized person, 
either from the words of the officer 
or the clear import of the circumstances, 
that the person is at liberty to go about 
his or her business. 
Utah v. Higgens, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted.) 
Thus, the District Court incorrectly concluded that the encounter with 
Trooper Eldridge was a consensual encounter. It is well established that once 
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the reason for the stop is completed, the occupants must be allowed to 
proceed on their way, without further detention. 
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), a deputy 
observed defendant's vehicle drift into the emergency lane two separate times. 
Id. at 653. Suspecting that the driver was intoxicated, the deputy pulled the 
vehicle over. After approaching the occupants, the deputy concluded that the 
defendants were not intoxicated. The facts set forth to justify exceeding the 
scope were as follows: the driver was visibly nervous when he handed the 
deputy his dr iver 's license, the occupant did not have a driver 's license, 
neither one of the occupants were the registered owner of the car, and the 
deputy noted that the route that they were driving was not the most direct 
route for their claimed destination. IcL at 654. The deputy ran an NCIC 
check on the dr iver 's identification and the check proved to be negative. The 
deputy then asked if there were any firearms, contraband, or alcohol in the 
vehicle. One of the occupants replied, "No, but if you'd like to check, go 
ahead". The ensuing search revealed four kilograms of cocaine. Ld. at 654-
655. This Court held that there were no facts supporting a finding of 
reasonable articulable suspicion which would, in turn , justify the detention 
after the deputy concluded that the occupants were not intoxicated. 
Likewise, in State v. Robinson, supra, this Court held that after the 
purpose of a traffic stop had been completed, "[a]ny further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning . . . is justified under the fourth 
amendment only if the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious 
criminal activity. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. 
There, the driver made an abrupt traffic lane change in front of the 
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trooper 's vehicle which almost resulted in a collision. IcL at 433. After giving 
the driver a warning for the illegal lane change, the following factors were 
set forth to justify the continued detention: one of the defendants (Towers) 
appeared to be nervous and failed to make eye contact whereas the other 
(Robinson) was talkative and evasive about questions concerning the van; the 
officers observed a homemade bed in the back of the van, there was no cold 
weather gear despite the fact that the defendants stated that they were going 
to Wyoming, the defendants failed to produce written permission to use the 
vehicle and the troopers were unable to reach the owner of the van to 
confirm the permissive use of the vehicle. IcL at 435-36. 
This Court held that such factors did not rise to the level of reasonable 
suspicion: 
In sum, we conclude that the trial 
court clearly erred in its findings that 
the troopers had the reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity necessary to justify 
their continued detention and questioning 
of Robinson and Towers once the warning 
citation had been given and the purposes 
of the initial stop had been accomplished. 
Defendants' detention after that point was, 
therefore, a violation of their fourth 
amendment r ights. 
[d. at 436-37. 
Godina-Luna, Robinson, and Lopez as well as other appellate cases 
compel a finding by this Court that the trooper unreasonably detained Mr. 
tfilley and his companion after the stop. To justify the detention, the trooper 
Mmust point to specific, articulable facts, which together with rational 
nferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
iefendant had committed or was about to commit a crime"1. State v. Carner, 
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812 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1338 (Utah 
1992((quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Therefore, the unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively, at 
the point when the trooper gave the verbal warning and did not allow the 
occupants to proceed on their way. Accordingly, the seizure was unreasonable 
under Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution. All evidence seized as the fruit of the 
unlawful continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
2. Trooper Eldridege Did Not Have Probable Cause to Justify an Warrantless 
Search of the Automobile. 
It is well established that a warrantless search of an automobile is per 
sa unreasonable absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). 
In this case, the trooper articulated the following facts as providing 
probable cause for the warrantless search of the van: the odor of alcohol on 
the breath of an person who was not impaired and the presence of several 12-
packs, one of which was open, with one-half of the containers missing. 
Trooper Eldridge lacked the specific information to justify a warrantless 
search. Robinson, 791 P.2d at 436. It is not illegal to drink and then drive 
unless one's driving skills are impaired or their blood-alcohol content is .08. 
Nor is it illegal to t ranspor t closed containers in a vehicle. That one of the 
cartons was open, with one-half of the containers missing does not mean that 
the beverages were consumed in the vehicle. There are no other factors 
which would support this suspicion, such as the odor of alcohol emanating 
from the vehicle or the presence of bottle c#ps. Indeed, the missing 
containers suggests that the beverages had been consumed at a different time. 
It is clear that Mr. Patefield had not recently consumed all the beer that was 
missing since he was not intoxicated and it is disingenuous to suggest that he 
drank only one in the vehicle and the others elsewhere. Moreover, the open 
12-pack with missing containers is consistent with innocent activity and 
therefore does not support reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. 
See Reid v. Georgia. 488 U.S. 438, 441 (1981)(Held that law enforcement could 
not base reasonable suspicion on factors which "describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers"); Robinson, 791 P.2d at 436 (same). 
Secondly, the trooper was not confronted with exigent circumstances. 
The State failed to produce evidence that the means necessary for securing a 
search warrant were unavailable to the trooper. The availability of a 
telephonic search warrant is one factor in determining the existence of exigent 
circumstances. Utah v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
There was no indication that the vehicle would be unavailable for a search 
should the trooper have to wait for a search warrant. Larocco, at 470. 
Indeed, the trooper had the authority to hold the vehicle pending the arrival 
of a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 752 (1979). The search in 
the absence of exigent circumstances, therefore, constitutes an unreasonable 
search under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Larocco, at 471. 
Accordingly, all evidence seized as the fruit of the unlawful search must be 
suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-
18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
3. Failure to Apprise Mr» Willey of his "Miranda" Warnings Renders Any 
Statements Inadmissible. 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that the 
accused shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. Likewise Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution provides 
the same privilege against self-incrimination. To perfect this right, the United 
States Supreme Court has established procedural safeguards the police must 
honor before interrogating a suspect in custody. These include warning the 
suspect that the has the r ight to remain silent and to have an attorney 
present during questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
"Custody", for a person who has not been formally arrested, is 
determined for the purposes of Miranda by looking at (1) the site of 
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the suspect; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of ar res t were present; and (4) the length and 
form of interrogation- See Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Utah 1983)(Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of precisely when a 
person is in custody for "Miranda" purposes and held that it is "at the point 
the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions 
must be prefaced with a Miranda warning"). 
In State v. Mirquet, P.2d , 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), 
the defendant was pulled over for speeding. The trooper ordered him to sit 
in the patrol car. While there, the trooper asked him if he had been smoking 
marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed this Court's findings and conclusions 
that the defendant was in custody and deserved, but was not apprised of 
Miranda warnings. Mirquet, 664 P.2d at 4. This Court found that: 
(1) the site of the interrogation was 
inside the police car; (2) Officer 
Mangelson's investigation focused solely 
on defendant; (3) the objective indica 
of arres t were present, although the 
conclusion that an ar res t had occurred 
was neither compelled nor devoid of any 
indications that an ar res t had occurred; 
(4) the length and form of the 
interrogation evidenced a coercive intent 
on the par t of the officer which 
significantly bore on the ultimate 
questions; and (5) the place of the 
interrogation added to the coercive 
environment. 
Mirquet, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Willey was advised by Trooper Eldridge that he 
was going to receive a citation for possession of paraphernalia. The trooper 
took Mr. Willey's drivers license and told Mr. Willey to follow him back to the 
public safety building in Monticello. Accordingly, Mr. Willey was significantly 
deprived of his freedom of action. Moreover, there were objective indicia of 
an ar res t as any reasonable person would not have felt that he could have 
terminated the encounter. 
In addition to the custody issue, this Court must next determine 
whether Willey was interrogated. Miranda warnings are required only when 
the police directly interrogates the suspect or when, indirectly, police conduct 
evinces an intent to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291. 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690 (1980)("the definition of 
interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police 
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.") (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). 
Here, Willey was directly asked if he owned the dog after the trooper 
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discovered the dog t a g s in the unclaimed fanny pack which contained the 
mari juana. Accordingly, t h e t roope r knew tha t Mr, Willey's answer was 
reasonab ly likely to elicit an incr iminat ing r e sponse . Thus , t h a t Mr, Willey 
was in t e r roga t ed is ind i spu tab le . 
Under t he se c i rcumstances , Mr. Willey was c lear ly in cus tody and was 
ent i t led to Miranda w a r n i n g s . Fai lure to give the r e q u i r e d warn ings r e n d e r s 
any s ta tements inadmissible . Wong Sun v. United S ta te s , 371 U.S. 471, 488, 
833 S.Ct, 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing r e a s o n s , th i s Court should r e v e r s e the t r ia l cou r t ' s 
ru l ing on t h e motion to s u p p r e s s ev idence . 
DATED th i s '0^ day of J a n u a r y , 1995. 
fully submit ted: 
>ALIE REILLY 
at torney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The u n d e r s i g n e d h e r e b y cer t i f ies t h a t t r u e and co r r ec t copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appel lant was mailed, pos tage p repa id , to J an Graham, Office 
of the At torney General , Appellate Division, 236 South Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 and h a n d - d e l i v e r e d to theXtffice of t he San J u a n County Attorney, 
a t 297 South Main in Monticello, U t a K o n I h i s f0&~ day of J a n u a r y , 1996. 
ROSALIE REILLY 
At torney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against 
himself. 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
II. UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself. 
Utah Const, article 1, section 12 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated. 
Utah Const, article 1, section 14 
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Rosalie Reilly #6637 
148 South Main #9 
Post Office Box 404 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
(801) 587-3266 
Attorney for Defendant 
WILLIAM A. WILLEY 
SEVEN in L i i i f , u i j u u r i 
San Juan County 
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CLERK Or THE COURT 
BY. 
Deputy 
IN AND FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM WILLEY, 
Defendant. 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE; NOTICE OF 
HEARING 
Case No. 9517-117 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
TO: SAN JUAN COUNTY ATTORNEY CRAIG HALLS: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 5th day of September, 1995, at 
1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the 
courtroom of the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge, 
defendant, William Willey, will bring on for hearing the following 
motion: 
MOTION 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Defendant, William Willey, by and through his attorney of record, 
Rosalie Reilly, hereby moves this Court for an Order to suppress 
all evidence and statements obtained in violation of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, to wit: 
1. The observations of any police officer after the initial 
automobile stop, including, but not limited to, the observations 
made during the search of the vehicle, and/or of his person; 
2. Any statements attributed to Defendant; and 
3. All tangible evidence seized as the result of the search. 
See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
DATED this ^ — day of August, 1995 
Respectfully submitted, 
JALIE REILLY 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Craig Halls at the Public Safety Building 
located at 297 South Main, in Mon^ixjello, Utah, on this 3 (£ day 
of August, 1995. 
IOSALIE REILLY 
Attorney for Defendant 
